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The physician-patient relationship, which is the cornerstoneofmedical practice, is
based upon a transaction between a sufferer and a healer. The healer is not only con-
fronted with the patient's immediate medical needs but also with psycho-social prob-
lems which the illness causes, or is caused by. The physician therefore fulfills many
functions: those of a technologist, philosopher, priest, social worker, and economic
advisor. In discussing the influence of religious commitment on medical practice it is
helpful to dissect the practice ofmedicine into the physician's different functions. Al-
though these functions may overlap, for the purpose ofdiscussion they may be classi-
fied into two groups: (A) therapeutic functions and (B) etthical functions. Therapeutic
functions deal with the scientific aspect of medicine, how to treat disease. Ethical
functions deal with philosophical questions, e.g., should one treat disease? When
called upon to fulfill a therapeutic function, such as diagnosing and treating pneu-
monia, diabetes mellitus, or myocardial infarction, the physician functions as a tech-
nologist, operating on scientific grounds. The rules ofcompetent medical practice are
relatively clear and will be followed by all physicians regardless of their religious
commitment. It is when called upon to fulfill an ethical function such as deciding
whether to treat a secondary illness in a primarily hopeless situation that religious
commitment may influence medical practice. An example of such a situation is the
patient with an incurable cancer suffering great pain, who develops pneumonia. By
withholding antibiotic therapy the physician allows the pneumonia to carry the
patient away, thus relieving him ofhis pain. The physician must now decide whether
or not to treat the pneumonia. What guidelines can the physician follow when con-
fronted with this ethical question?Theguidelines I follow are dictated by my religious
commitment. I subscribe to the views ofOrthodox Judaism. In this religious system,
all human acts are legislated by law considered to be of divine origin. These laws
treat the same questions raised by the secular medical ethicist and very often give the
same answers. For the Orthodox Jew, however, medical ethics are based on divine
law rather than on philosophy. These laws therefore are not subject to the whims of
society nor to the interpretation and influence of a human dictator. By the religious
anchoring of medical ethics one is assured of a standard to be followed in every
generation in every social milieu. The advantage offirmly anchoring medical ethics in
an inviolate law rather than a personal ethic which can be changed by manipulating
public opinion was demonstrated in recent history. Leo Alexander in his paper
"Medical Science under Dictatorship" (1) writes,
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Nazi propaganda was highly effective in perverting public opinion and public conscience, in a re-
markably short time. In the medical profession this expressed itself in a rapid decline in standards or
professional ethics. Medical science in Nazi Germany collaborated with the regime particularly in the
mass extermination of the chronically sick in the interest of saving "useless" expenses to the com-
munity as a whole. Sterilization and Euthanasia of persons with chronic mental illnesses was dis-
cussed at a meeting of Bavarian psychiatrists in 1931. By 1936 extermination of the physically or
socially unfit was so openly accepted that its practice was mentioned incidentally in an article
published in an official German medical journal. Lay opinion was not neglected in this campaign.
Adults were propagandized by motion pictures, one of which entitled "I Accuse," deals entirely with
euthanasia. This film depicts the life history of a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis; in it her
husband, a doctor, finally kills her to the accompaniment of soft piano music rendered by a sym-
pathetic colleague in an adjoining room. Acceptance of this ideology was implanted even in the
children. A widely used high-school mathematics text, "Mathematics in the Service of National
Political Education," published in Germany, 1936, includes problems stated in distorted terms of the
cost of care for and rehabilitating the chronically sick and crippled. One of the problems asked, for
instance, how many new housing units could be built and how many marriage-allowance loans could
be given to newly wedded couples for the amount of money it cost the state to care for "the crippled,
the criminal and the insane."
Thus by proper propaganda techniques it was possible to convince a highly edu-
cated people that the butchering of humans considered inferior and incapable of the
proper quality oflife was ethical.
A further significant consequence of basing medical ethics on divine law rather
than on personal ethics is my approach to fellow physicians. When stating my posi-
tion on ethical questions, I do so not out of moral rectitude and self righteousness
but, rather, as an obedient servant. Those who do not accept these laws may be just
as moral as I am. I pass nojudgement.
Having anchored the basis of my medical ethics in Jewish law, I should now define
the status of the physician in Jewish law. Is it permitted to heal the sick? Does man
have the right to interfere with the deliberate designs of providence? The answer to
these questions is clearly stated in Rabbinic law. "The Torah gave permission to the
physician to heal. Moreover this is a religious precept and it is included in the cate-
gory of saving life (2). The physician receives a license to heal. Indeed, it is the phy-
sician's duty to disregard all other religious injunctions in order to save life. For
example, the physician may do work on the Sabbath in order to save life. This special
status however, pertains purely to therapeutic interventions to sustain life. In decid-
ing ethical dilemmas, the physician has no special status; he is governed by law and
must act accordingly. It is not the physician's right or responsibility to decide ques-
tions of personal rights and social freedom.
I shall now briefly discuss Jewish law pertaining to the following questions:
euthanasia, abortion, and medical experimentation.
EUTHANASIA
The steady advance of technological skills towards the indefinite prolongation of
life has focused attention on the question of euthanasia. Whether by reason ofmount-
ing costs, the suffering imposed upon terminal patients and their families, or the in-
evitable denial of limited facilities to other patients, the question of euthanasia must
be addressed. Despite the current interest in the question, it is not unique to our civi-
lization, having been discussed in antiquity (3).
Euthanasia may be classified under the following forms (4): (i) eugenic euthanasia;
(ii) active medical euthanasia; (iii) passive medical euthanasia.
Eugenic euthanasia encompasses the killing of malformed babies and socially un-
desirable individuals such as the mentally retarded and the psychiatrically disturbed.
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Active medical euthanasia is exemplified by the case in which a drug or other treat-
ment is administered to hasten death. Passive medical euthanasia is defined as the
withholding oftherapy so that death is not prevented by therapeutic intervention.
Jewish law clearly forbids eugenic as well as active medical euthanasia. Passive
medical euthanasia, however, the withholding of therapeutic measures, may be
allowed under Jewish law in very specific cases. The critical question applying to a
particular case is whether one is shortening lifeor shortening the act ofdying.
A Rabbinic passage (5) from no later than the eighth century C.E. states:
One who is in adying condition (Hebrew: goses) is regarded as a living person in all respects. One may
not move him until he dies. One may not close the eyes of the dying person. He who touches him or
moves him is shedding blood; as Rabbi Meir (second century) used to say: this can be compared to a
flickering flame; as soon as a person touches it, it becomes extinguished. So too, whosoever closes the
eyesofthedying person is considered to have taken his soul.
Maimonides (6) (1135-1204) treats this subject matter as follows:
A goses is regarded as a living person in all respects. He is not to be rubbed or washed, nor is sand or
salt to be put upon him until he expires. He who touches him is guilty ofshedding blood. To what may
he be compared? To a flickering flame, which is extinguished as soon as one touches it. Whoever
closes the eyesofthe dying while the soul is about to depart is shedding blood.
Rabbi Jacob ben Asher (1269-1343) in his code (7) extends the prohibition against
active euthanasia to include psychological stress. For he forbids the undertaking of
funeral arrangements before the onset of death lest the patient hear of Lhis and his
death be hastened.
The question of passive euthanasia is first treated by a thirteenth century Jewish
ethical treatise in the "Book of the Pious," where it is written; "If a person is dying
and someone near his house is chopping wood so that the soul cannot depart then one
should remove the woodchopper from there" (8).
Based on the "Book of the Pious," Rabbi Moses Isserles (1510-1572) permits the
removal of any hindrance to the departure of the soul, such as a clattering noise,
since such action involves no active hastening of death, but only the removal of an
impediment (9).
Rabbi Solomon Eger, a nineteenth century jurist, in his commentary on Karo's
code quotes other Rabbinic sources who state; "It is forbidden to hinder the depar-
tureofthe soul by the use ofmedicine" (10).
Based on these rulings some authorities permit the removal ofmedications, or ma-
chines, from the patient in irreversible coma with no prospect of recovery, as long as
no natural means of sustenance such as food and oxygen are withdrawn (11). Other
opinions will not tolerate any relaxation of efforts to prolong life however artificial
and ultimately hopeless (12).
ABORTION
In Jewish law the destruction of an unborn fetus is not considered murder,
punishable as a capital offense. This ruling is based on theTalmudic interpretation of
the Biblical injunction against murder. Exodus 12:12, "He that smiteth man so that
he dieth shall surely be put to death." The word "man" is interpreted by the Talmud
to exclude a fetus (13). Nonetheless the destruction of the fetus is a moral offense
which can be justified only by consideration for the mother's life or health. The
Mishnah (14) states: "Ifa woman is having difficulty in giving birth, so that her life is
in danger, one cuts up the fetus within her womb and extracts it limb by limb, be-
cause her life takes precedence over that ofthe fetus. However, ifthegreater part of
the fetus was already born, one may not sacrifice the fetus for the mother because
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one may not set aside one person's life for that of another." The right to sacrifice the
unborn fetus to save the mother's life rests upon the fact that such an embryo is not
considered a person until it is born. The point at which human life becomes inviolable
and ofequal value to that ofany living person is thus distinctly fixed as the moment
when the greater part of the body has emerged from the birth canal. Whereas the
fetus' "right to life" on an equal footing with those already living is first established
at the time ofbirth, the fetus does acquire certain rights during gestation. During the
first 40 days ofgestation the fetus is considered as mere fluid (15). After the first 40
days the fetus is considered as a partial person. This is evident from the laws regard-
ing ritual impurity (16) and offerings (17) that a woman who aborts after 40 days of
gestation must adhere to.
Abortion on demand is prohibited by Rabbinic law (18). Some commentaries (19)
prohibit abortion because ofinjunctions upon the mother against needlessly wound-
ing herself(20), orneedlessly placing herselfin danger (21), or both, depending on the
method used to abort. Other commentaries invoke the "right to life" theory for their
ruling (22). Therapeutic abortion, although permitted, is dependent on the danger to
the mother and the length ofgestation. Some rabbinic rulings are of the opinion that
as the fetus has no status at all prior to 40 days after conception it is permissible to
perform an abortion during this period for fear that a deformed child may be born, as
in the case ofthalidomideingestion or theexposure to German measles early in preg-
nancy (23). Forty days in this context may meanjust under 2 months in the currently
accepted calculation of the pregnancy period, due to the discrepency between the
Rabbinic and medical methods in determining the date of conception. Other Rab-
binic rulings prohibit abortion in these cases because they are not definitely thera-
peutic to the mother (24). Most Rabbinic authorities require abortion where the
health of the mother is threatened (25). Such dangers may include deafness (26),
cancer, or psychiatric disease (27). Some authorities permit abortion for any ma-
ternal need (28), such as in the event of incest or rape (29). All agree that abortion
must be undertaken when the lifeofthe mother is in acute danger. After the head or
greater part of the infant is born, only a threat to both lives would allow sacrifice of
the child to save the mother (30).
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
In no areaofmedical ethics do the secular ethicist and religious ethicist differ more
in their approach to aproblem than on thequestion ofhuman experimentation. Both
require that there be a determination of the rightness or wrongness of the action;
both agree that ideas such as "'the advancement of knowledge" or "benefiting man-
kind" alone are not sufficientjustification. For the secular ethicist a crucial element
in answer to the question "what constitutes right action in medical practice?" is the
requirement ofa reasonably free and adequately informed consent. The definition of
informed consentmay be found in the Articles ofthe Nuremberg Tribunal (31).
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person in-
volved should have legal capacity togive consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free
power ofchoice, without the intervention ofany element offorce, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching,
orother ulterior form ofconstraint orcoercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehen-
sion ofthe elements ofthesubject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and en-
lightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision
by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of
theexperiment; the methods and meansby which itis to beconducted; all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from
his participation in the experiment.
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In Jewish law this concept has no validity. The biblical injunction against need-
lessly wounding oneself (20) or needlessly placing oneself in danger (32) invalidates
free and informed consent. For, in fact, the patient does not have the right to grant
consent. Similarly, consent is not required for operations deemed medically
necessary for his health. The principles applied in Rabbinic law to the question of
human experimentation are summarized by Immanuel Jakobovits (33), the Chief
Rabbi of the British Commonwealth. These principles state (i) that human life is in-
violable and of infinite worth. Every life therefore is equally valuable, including that
of criminals, prisoners, and defectives. (ii) One may not sacrifice one life to save
another, or even any number ofothers. (iii) One does not have the right to volunteer
one's life or injure one's own or anyone else's body except for tangible therapeutic
purposes. (iv) A person does not have the right to refuse medical treatment deemed
necessary by competent opinion. (v) Measures involving some immediate risks oflife
may-be taken in attempts to prevent certain death. (vi) An obligation to save a person
from any hazard to his life or health devolves on anyone able to do so. From these
principles Jakobovits derives the following tentative conclusions:
(a) Possibly hazardous experiments may be performed on humans only if they be
potentially helpful to the subject himself, however remote the chances ofsuccess are.
(b) It is obligatory to apply to critically ill patients even untried or uncertain cures
in an attempt to wardoffcertain death later, ifno safe treatment is available.
(c) In all other cases, it is as wrong to volunteer for such experiments as it is un-
ethical to submit persons to them, whether with or without their consent, and
whether they are normal people, criminals, prisoners, cripples, idiots, or patients on
their deathbed.
(d) If the experiment involves no hazards to life or health, the obligation to
volunteer for it devolves on anyone who may thereby help to promote the health in-
terests ofothers.
(e) Under such circumstances and provided the anticipated benefit is real and sub-
stantial enough to invoke the precept of "You shall not stand upon the blood ofyour
neighbour," it may not be unethical to carry out these harmless experiments even
without the subject's consent.
(f) In the treatment ofpatients generally, whether the cures are tested oronly ex-
perimental, only the opinion of competent medical experts counts, not the wishes of
the patient; and physicians are ethically required to take whatever therapeutic
measures they consider essential for the patient's life and health, irrespective of the
chance that they may subsequently be liable to legal claims for unauthorized "assault
and battery."
(g) Wherever possible, exhaustive tests ofnew medications or surgical procedures
must first be performed on animals. These should, however, be guarded at all times
against experiencing any avoidablepain.
Jewish law in regard to euthanasia, abortion, and medical experimentation is sin-
gularly striking in the absence of a special status for the physician or the patient.
Competent medical opinion is essential to supply the factual data, but the decisions
themselves must be made along legislativeguidelines.
This position, however, is found only in questions pertaining to ethical decisions.
Where a therapeutic purpose is to be fulfilled the opinions of the doctor and the
patient are ofjudicial importance. An example of this is the law pertaining to the ill
patient and hisobligation to fast on Yom Kippur, the Day ofAtonement. The Biblical
requirement ofcomplete abstinence from all food and drink on Yom Kippur is par-
ticularly sacred. The law nonetheless states that ifthe doctordetermines that fasting
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would be detrimental to the health ofthe patient, the patient is obliged to eaton Yom
Kippur. Fasting in this situation would be sinful. Ifhowever, the doctor finds fasting
permissible, whereas the patient finds it too difficult, the patient may be fed.
Two principles permeate the Jewish attitude in regard to medical questions. The
first is the patient's obligation not to harm himselfor to placehimselfin danger need-
lessly. The second is the physician's license to heal and his obligation to endeavor to
restore his patient's health (34). The physician is not asked to "play God," nor is he
allowed to do so. Ethical questions are legislated by a religious law which is binding
on both physician and patient.
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